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1976] NOTES
Though the questions discussed above are significant, perhaps the
most important remaining one is the viability of the Loescher holding itself.
In a four to three decision the court has chosen a new and potentially
confusing method for extending liability under article 2317.48 In light of the
fact that the use of a presumption of negligence under this article could
accomplish similar results while retaining familiar negligence concepts and
definitions,49 the future of the Loescher approach is by no means certain."0
David Dugas
SUPERVISORY WRITS: A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN APPELLATE
REVIEW OF FACTS
AND THE RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY TRIAL?
Plaintiffs brought an action to recover for the death of their minor
daughter who was struck by a car driven by defendant's employee. After a
jury verdict in favor of the defendant, plaintiffs appealed, claiming that the
trial judge's refusal to give a requested instruction' prevented the jury from
applying the correct legal principle to the facts. The appellate court held that
this refusal was reversible error and remanded the case for a new trial. 2 The
Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that the jury instruction should have been
given but held that when a court of appeal is in possession of a full record, it
(4) a link in the causal chain of damage done to the plaintiff in order that the defendant be
exonerated from liability.
48. The approach is potentially confusing because of the references to negligence
concepts that are made while attempting to move beyond those same concepts. See note
44, supra.
49. Using article 2317 to raise a presumption of negligence as done in Dupre v.
Traveler's Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 98 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1968), could accomplish essentially the
same end as Loescher by merely raising the burden of rebuttal. See text at notes 9 & 10,
supra. Cf. Simon v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
50. An indication as to how the Louisiana Supreme Court may view Loescherin the
future may be found in recent "slip and fall" cases in which the court did notapply article
2317 to determine a storekeeper's liability, but rather used a presumption of negligence.
See Gonzales v. Winn Dixie, 326 So. 2d 486 (La. 1976). If Loescher is extended to other
situations in the future, it will almost certainly be used in automobile "latent defect"
cases, since the court expressly overruled.Cartwright v. Fireman 's Ins. Co., 254 La. 330,
223 So. 2d 822 (1969).
I. Gonzales v. XeroxCorp., 320So. 2d 163, 164(La. 1975). The requested instruction
concerned a motorist's duty to keep a close watch; the general instruction given by the judge
dealt with a motorist's duty when approaching small children.
2. 307 So. 2d 153 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1974).
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must decide on the merits and may not remand. Gonzales v. Xerox
Corporation, 320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975).
The Louisiana Constitution provides that appellate jurisdiction shall
extend to law and facts. 3 Although not given a constitutional basis until
1882,4 appellate review of facts was exercised as early as 1816.1 Generally
appellate courts have examined the facts and have reversed and rendered
when the factfinder's conclusions were found to be against the weight of the
evidence. 6 An exception appeared in Herbert v. Travelers Indemnity
Company7 in which the Fourth Circuit, by holding that an appellate court
should reverse and render only when a preponderance of the evidence would
support no other conclusion, evinced its belief that close factual situations
should be subjected to a jury's scrutiny. Appellate review of facts was
further limited by Bienvenu v. Angelle8 which declared that a failure to
remand in cases containing erroneous factual conclusions precipitated by
improper jury instructions denies the parties their constitutional right to a
trial, as well as their statutory right to a trial by jury.9 Despite the policy of
vigilantly guarding the right to a jury trial expressed in Bienvenu, the
appellate courts have continued to reverse and render judgments.'°
In the instant case the court considered whether an appellate court has
discretion to remand a case when a full record of the trial is available. In
specifically overruling Bienvenu, the majority ordered the Court of Appeal
3. Gonzales was decided under La. Const. art. VII, §§ 10, 29 (1921). For
application of these provisions see, e.g., Crawford v. Bullock, 209 La. 552, 25 So. 2d
226 (1946). The provisions were carried forward with substantially the same language
to the 1974 Constitution. LA. CONsT. art. 5, §§ 5, 10.
4. La. Const. art. 81 (1879), as amended by La. Acts 1882, No. 125 (giving
appellate review of facts to the supreme court). La. Const. arts. 85, 98 (1913)
(extending appellate review of facts to the courts of appeal).
5. Abat v. Doliolle, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 316 (La. 1816) (noting the change of
procedure from trial de novo on appeal with recall of witnesses to the use of recorded
testimony).
6. E.g., Brown v. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co., 147 La. 829, 86 So. 281 (1920);
Barker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 220 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969); cf. Brown v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 250 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
7. 193 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
8. 254 La. 182, 223 So. 2d 140 (1969).
9. In holding that appellate courts must remand in certain instances, the court
relied exclusively on two cases, both of which were decided before appellate review
of facts became a constitutional mandate. Robinson v. Landrum, 10 La. Ann. 539
(1855); Beal v. M'Kiernan, 6 La. 407 (1834).
10. E.g., D'Amico v. Shell Oil Co., 293 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); cf.
Brown v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 250 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971)




to reverse and render and rejected the view of those few cases which have
limited the strict rule of appellate review of facts. " While basing its decision
primarily upon the constitutional provisions extending appellate jurisdiction
to facts,' 2 the court found further support in Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 2164, which provides that "[t]he appellate court shall
render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on
appeal." A footnote to the majority opinion explained that article 2164
embodies articles 905 and 906 of the 1870 Code of Practice,' 3 which
required the appellate court to render the judgment which the lower court
should have rendered' 4 and allowed remand only for the limited purpose of
receiving necessary testimony.' 5
The court also cited the benefits of judicial economy in support of its
reaffirmation of broad appellate review of facts. According to the court,
remanding when there is a full record will only crowd the dockets and slow
the judicial process.' 6 Justice Dixon, in dissent, attacked the majority's
reliance on judicial economy and cited Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 1978, which allows recorded testimony of the first trial to be used at
the second trial, in arguing that a jury is more expeditious than an appellate
court. 17
Although the Code of Civil Procedure recognizes the right to a jury
trial,' 8 the Louisiana Constitution does not guarantee one,' 9 and the federal
II. 320 So. 2d at 166.
12. La. Const. art. VII, §§ 10, 29 (1921).
13. 320So. 2d at 163 n.] ; see alsoLA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2164, comments (c) & (d).
14. La. Code of Practice art. 905 (1870).
15. Id. art. 906. See, e.g., White v. White, 161 La. 718, 109 So. 399 (1926);
Williamson v. Enterprise Brick Co., 178 So. 197 (La. App. I st Cir. 1938). Cases under
the Code of Civil Procedure are in accord. E.g., Subdivision Planning Eng'rs, Inc. v.
Manor Dev. Corp., 290 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
16. 320 So. 2d at 166. Remanding to the court of appeal in the instant case
seemingly ignored the supreme court's own jurisdiction over facts; however, the
court might justify the procedure with the belief that the court of appeal was more
familiar with the record.
17. 320 So. 2d at 167.
18. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1731 ("The right of trial by jury is recognized."); see,
e.g., Champagne v. American Southern Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 437 (La. 1974); Hill v.
Green, 275 So. 2d 407 (La. 1973).
19. Hubert, Trial by Jury under the New Code of Civil Procedure, 35 TUL. L;
REV. 520,522 (1961); cf. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17; La. Const. art. I, § 3 (1921) (limited to
criminal trials). But LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 provides: "in every expropriation, a party
has the right to trial by jury to determine compensation." Since the right to a jury trial
in expropriation cases is of constitutional dimension, it is arguable whether Gonzales
will preclude a remand in such cases.
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constitutional right to a civil jury trial2" has never been extended to civil suits
in state courts. 2' While litigants in Louisiana do have a statutory right to a
jury trial when they properly request one, 22 they are subjected on appeal to
the constitutional and statutory scheme of appellate review of facts. Under
that scheme, when an error is committed at trial23 it is correctible on appeal
if there is a complete record, and allowing a discretionary remand is
inconsistent with appellate review of facts. On remand, it is not necessary to
recall the witnesses. 24 Thus, the jury, in a second trial, would not be able to
assess the credibility of the original witnesses, and if appealed again, the
second record would be substantially the same as the first. 25 Therefore a
discretionary remand after the record is complete does not properly balance
the right to a civil jury trial with the scheme of appellate review of facts.
Similarly, complete application of appellate review of facts cannot
afford the proper balance since a full application of such a scheme would
cast the trial court in the role of court stenographer for the appellate courts.
The purpose or function of trial courts seems uncertain in a system which
apparently would not accord them a conclusive role in fact finding26 and this
uncertainty might cause participants in such proceedings to lose interest and
respect for the court. To partially alleviate this problem, the Louisiana
appellate judiciary has created self-imposed limitations on the scope of its
review of facts. The prejudicial error rules allow reversal only of those
factual conclusions deemed "manifestly erroneous," 27 thus preserving the
significance attached to demeanor evidence and to the trial court's assess-
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
21. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875) (reviewing Louisiana procedure);
Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 943
(1973) (where the Court in dicta said that even assuming the seventh amendment
applied to states, the Louisiana practice would not be unconstitutional). Cf. Booth v.
Home Indem. Co., 244 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1957).
22. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1731; e.g., Hall v. Green, 275 So. 2d 407 (La. 1973),
Block v. Fitts, 259 La. 555, 250 So. 2d 738 (1971).
23. E.g., Pfister v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 290 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1974) (improper jury instruction); Link v. Shreveport Rys., 153 So. 77 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1934) (impaneling an improper jury).
24. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1978; Hirst v. Lord, 9 Orl. App. 316 (La. App. 1912).
25. SeeNote, 41 TUL. L. REV. 922, 925 (1967). Cf. Bryant v. Saint Paul Fire&
Marine Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d 448 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
26. The trial court is the proper forum for resolving factual issues. Reeder v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d I I I (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970). "Trial courts exist, and
there must be reasons for them." Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions of
Fact in Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 78, 88 (1968).
27. Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
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ment of the credibility of witnesses. 28 Appellate courts also accord the fact
finder great discretion in awarding damages. 29 Such limitations serve to
reduce the workload of appellate courts as well as clarifying the trial courts'
function. The Bienvenu holding added an additional limitation on appellate
review of facts that reflected a concern for protecting the traditional right to
a jury trial. 3"
In overruling Bienvenu, the supreme court did not alter the "manifest
error" rule 3' since an appellate court will still have to find "manifest error"
before it can reverse and render. Gonzales does, however, sweep away the
Bienvenu attempt to protect the right to a jury trial. The constitutional duty
of appellate review of facts should not completely engulf the statutory right
to a jury trial. 32 Since neither full application of appellate review of facts nor
total protection of the right to a jury trial by remand is workable, the
judiciary should attempt to reconcile the two objectives by eliminating,
where possible, those errors that force the appellate court to give the trial no
purpose other than completing a record that can be reviewed on appeal.
Supervisory writs 33 provide a means to achieve such a result. At
present, courts deny writs absent a showing of irreparable injury, i.e., when
adequate remedy is unavailable on appeal. 34 After Gonzales, however,
there will always be an "adequate" remedy on appeal since the appellate
courts can correct all errors either by reversing and rendering if there is a
complete record, or remanding if there is not. Therefore, to afford protec-
tion to the right to a jury trial, 35 a new approach to granting supervisory writs
should be considered.
28. Id. at 724; Comment, Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 21
LA. L. REV. 402, 425 (1961).
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934(3);Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149,
reh'g 245 La. 264, 158 So. 2d 157 (1963).
30. The right to a jury trial is traditional in the sense that it is constitutionally
guaranteed in federal courts, and guaranteed by statute in Louisiana.
31. The manifest error rule is not discussed in the instant case.
32. Cf. Champagne v. American Southern Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 437 (La. 1974);
Hill v. Green, 275 So. 2d 407 (La. 1973).
33. LA. CONST. art. V, § 10; La. Const. art. VII, § 29(1921), as amendedbyLa.
Acts 1958, No. 561; LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2201.
34. E.g., La Fleur v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 300 So. 2d 508 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974);
see alsoTate, Supervisory Powers of the Louisiana Courts ofAppeal, 38 TUL. L. REV.
429 (1964).
35. The appellate courts' protection of the right to a civil jury trial can be seen in
cases where courts have reviewed denials of jury trials through their supervisory
jurisdiction. "[A] litigant's right to a jury trial is fundamental, and if doubt exists, it




Obviously, every error which can adversely affect the trial proceedings
should not warrant invoking the court's supervisory jurisdiction or the
appellate courts will be flooded with writ applications that will disrupt
otherwise orderly trial proceedings.36 However, judicial efficiency can
support granting of writs when appeal could not cure the error, such as an
abuse of discovery, 37 or when the appeal could only cure by remand,38 such
as when the record will be incomplete due to an exclusion of evidence. 39
Writs in the latter situation insure the appellate court a complete record to
review' while protecting the right to a proper jury trial.
Those errors which under Gonzales can be corrected on appeal by
reversing and rendering a" create the most difficult problem in deciding
whether supervisory writs are proper. The probability of the error affecting
the verdict might be one factor guiding the court's exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction. Another relevant consideration includes the possibility that the
lower court can correct the error itself prior to the completion of its
proceedings. In estimating the substantiality of the error, the appellate court
should assume the party now requesting writs will receive an adverse
decision on the merits, and if it feels the error will require according no
weight at all to the jury's conclusions, 42 supervisory writs should be
granted. For example, denying one party the right to present expert
testimony relating to causation or negligence in order to. rebut contradictory
36. Cf. Tate, supra no 34, at 448.
37. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1452: ... the court may render any .. order
which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue expense"; Nicholson v. Holloway Planting Co., 284 So.
2d 898 (La. 1973).
38. By correcting the error at trial, the appellate court will eliminate the need for
a remand after the case is appealed and may eliminate the need for an appeal
altogether.
39. See White v. White, 161 La. 718, 109 So. 2d 399 (1926); Martin v. Garlotte,
285 So. 2d 875 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1973).
40. A more liberal granting of supervisory writs will decrease erroneous verdicts
based on an incomplete record in those few cases tried before a jury.
41. These errors should not include what a party feels is a wrong conclusion of
facts by the jury. Such errors are clearly correctible on appeal. E.g., Carter v. New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 305 So. 2d 481 (La. 1974). This category instead should
contain errors such as wrongful exclusion of evidence when the proffered testimony
is included in the record, or an improper jury instruction. Although correctible on
appeal, the jury cannot properly decide all the issues which a litigant has a right to
demand. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1934. E.g., Hill v. Green, 275 So. 2d 407, 409 (La.
1973) "Absent any specification of restrictions all issues shall be tried by the jury
when trial by jury is properly requested."




evidence4 3 removes the jury's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility
which might be the determining factor in the ultimate verdict." Similarly,
where the jury receives an improper instruction,45 the right to have the jury
apply the correct principles of law to the facts will be abridged if the error
remains uncorrected during trial.
Concededly, some writ applications, filed on frivolous grounds, will to
some extent disrupt trial proceedings. However, most attorneys will be
aware of possible adverse reactions by the trial judge in such cases and will
accordingly limit their writ applications to meritorious claims. Therefore, in
those cases where an error has destroyed any possibility of a proper jury
trial, the appellate courts, by being more lenient in granting supervisory
writs, can protect the right to a jury trial without hampering judicial
efficiency or invading the province of the jury until it is absolutely
necessary.46
Edward R. Greenlee
A NEW STANDARD OF FAULT FOR THE REPORTORIAL PRIVILEGE
Following a highly publicized divorce proceeding, Mary Alice Fire-
stone obtained a $100,000 libel award against Time magazine for publishing
a misstatement' of the trial judge's remarks 2 concerning the grounds for the
43. E.g., Herbert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 193 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1966).
44. Appellate courts recognize the trial court's unique ability to judge credibility
of witnesses. E.g., Andrews v. Williams, 281 So. 2d 120 (La. 1973). Even though
proffered testimony may be included in the record, in such a situation there can be no
determination of credibility based on demeanor.
45. E.g., Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975); Bienvenu v.
Angelle, 254 La. 182, 223 So. 2d 140 (1969).
46. There was an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate appellate review of facts at
the 1974 constitutional convention. Fear was expressed that removing appellate
review of facts would increase jury trials. Constitutional convention Vol. IX, 30th
day, pp. 50-93. Granting more supervisory writs will probably not result in more jury
trials since the facts are still reviewable on appeal.
I. The Time article read: "DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41,
heir to the tire fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife, a onetime
Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after
six years of marriage, one son: in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month
intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both
1976]
